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Abstract 
 
What do citizens of highly repressive regimes think about their governments? How do they 
respond to high levels of repression? This paper addresses these questions by examining the 
political attitudes of North Korean refugees. Unsurprisingly the evaluations of regime 
performance are negative, and there is some evidence that they are becoming more so, even 
among the core political class and government or party workers. While the sample marginally 
overrepresents groups with the most negative evaluation of the regime, multivariate analysis is 
used to generate projections of the views of the wider population; this exercise indicates that that 
the null hypothesis that the refugees accurately represent the views of the resident population 
cannot be rejected at the 95 percent level. However the survey also shows that the barriers to 
effective communication and collective action remain high; repression works to deter political 
activity. Partly due to economic exigency, partly due to repression, private defiance of the 
government takes the form of “everyday forms of resistance,” such as listening to foreign media 
and engaging in market activities. Although not overtly political, these actions have long-term 
political consequences. 
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 North Korea is probably the most repressive regime extant, scoring at the absolute bottom on all 
standard measures with respect to regime type, political and civil liberties, and human rights. In 
addition to the denial of freedoms typical of many authoritarian regimes, North Korea exhibits a 
number of peculiar political characteristics including an extraordinary propaganda machine and 
extremely tight control over the flow of information from foreign sources that might call the 
official worldview into question. At least until recently, the state socialist organization of the 
economy also provided a powerful tool for monitoring and controlling the lives of its citizens. A 
detailed classification of the population according to perceived political loyalty has been used to 
allocate education, jobs, and other social benefits through employment.1 
The coercive apparatus is large. The regime maintains a vast network of political prison 
camps that hold perhaps 100,000 to 200,000 political prisoners and an even larger network of 
lower-level labor training camps that have been used to punish a widening set of crimes against 
the state (Hawk 2003, KINU 2009, Haggard and Noland 2009a). There are numerous eyewitness 
accounts of public executions and other forms of brutality (Amnesty International 2004, KINU 
2009, Korean Bar Association 2009).  
Precisely because of their repressiveness, it is extremely difficult to study the politics of 
such systems: what citizens really think and how—and if—they engage in behavior that might be 
considered political. Yet we also know that public sentiment can turn against apparently 
unshakable dictatorships with amazing velocity, as small oppositions swell into overwhelming 
majorities. Individuals may harbor very adverse views of the regime, but engage in “preference 
falsification,” and similarly lack information on the true attitudes of others. As a result, they are 
effectively constrained to silence by threats of coercion. Once groups start to reveal their 
                                                 
1 The share deemed reliable is relatively small, on the order of one-quarter of the population, with a core elite of 
perhaps 200,000, or roughly one percent of the population (Foster-Carter 1994, Hunter 1999, Armstrong 2002). 
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 disaffection, others can be emboldened to do the same. Such “information cascades” help explain 
sharp political turning points, such as the collapse of the communist regimes of Eastern Europe 
(Kuran 1989, 1995a, 1995b; Lohmann 1994; and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch 1998 for 
a review).  
The repertoire of the citizenry in the face of extreme repression is by no means limited to 
a choice between quiescence and overt manifestations of disaffection. In a very different context, 
James C. Scott (1985) drew attention to what he called “everyday forms of peasant resistance,” 
such as shirking or the destruction of elite property. The retreat from the state sector into the 
market or other forms of private activity constitutes a parallel set of activities in a state socialist 
system. These activities can also reveal information that challenges official narratives, and can 
provide a public space beyond the reach of the state.  
A famine in the mid-1990s greatly accelerated the development of North Korea’s 
informal economy.2 As the state proved unable to play its traditional role as a provider of food, 
households fended for themselves. Government, party, and military entities as well as work units 
pursued a variety of coping behaviors including foraging, unauthorized movement, barter, and 
eventually monetized trade to secure food. The marketization that began with food gradually 
encompassed a broader range of household goods, and local government and party officials and 
enterprise managers even engaged in what might be called “wholesale” gray market activities.  
With the economy marketizing beyond state control, the government initiated a number 
of policy changes beginning in 1998 that decriminalized some of the coping practices that had 
developed in the previous decade (Noland 2000, 2004; Haggard and Noland 2007). These 
changes culminated in a major reform package in 2002.  
                                                 
2 Estimates vary widely, but the most sober academic research suggests that between 1994 and 1998, a famine killed 
perhaps 600,000 to 1 million people, or roughly 3 to 5 percent of the precrisis population (Haggard and Noland 
2007). 
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 But these coping strategies had deep political implications. Market activity pulled 
individuals out of the state sector, denying the regime both labor effort and tax revenue. More 
importantly, market activity proved difficult to monitor and created a private sphere in which 
information and even organizational constraints were relaxed. Insecure with respect to the 
domestic political as well as economic implications of economic change, the regime began to 
reverse the earlier reforms beginning in 2005. Nonetheless, the reassertion of the state did not 
succeed in stamping out the market, but rather only generated new strategies of evasion. 
Given the closed nature of the regime, it has been difficult if not impossible to secure 
first-hand knowledge of what North Koreans think about the regime, how those attitudes have 
changed over time, and whether changed attitudes might be matched with changed political 
behavior. However, refugee surveys provide a means of testing a number of propositions about 
citizen attitudes and behavior in highly repressive settings, including the extent of “everyday 
forms of resistance.” In this paper, we address these questions by drawing on an original survey 
of 300 North Korean refugees living in South Korea undertaken in November 2008.  
As is well known, refugees may not be a good barometer of political attitudes in their 
home countries for two interrelated reasons. First, having undertaken the extremely risky effort 
to leave their countries, they may hold distinctively negative views of the incumbent regime that 
are unrepresentative of the remaining resident population. From the White Russians who 
emigrated to Paris following the revolution to the Miami Cubans of the present day, refugees’ 
views of politics have been colored by particular resentments; unobserved (and perhaps 
unobservable) individual-level characteristics that make them unrepresentative. Second, refugee 
populations may also be unrepresentative in a demographic sense. For example, people from 
certain regions or occupations may be overrepresented in the refugee community.  
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 However, these selection problems may be somewhat less intractable than is frequently 
thought. There is evidence that the demographic profile of those who have left North Korea and 
landed in the south may be more similar to their compatriots than is often thought. Early 
defectors from North Korea were typically elites—higher-ranking party or military personnel—
many of whom took strongly ideological positions vis-à-vis the north. Over time, the 
demographics of the refugee population have shifted dramatically, and now include an ample 
representation of workers and farmers and those with only basic education. Moreover, the issue 
of a demographically unrepresentative sample can be addressed ex post through the application 
of multivariate statistical techniques, which can even be used to generate estimates of the views 
of the underlying population.  
The selection problem with respect to individual-level characteristics that might generate 
unusual aversion to the regime can also be addressed, albeit imperfectly. We can control ex post 
for a variety of experiential factors that might influence attitudes, such as incarceration or ill-
treatment at the hands of authorities.  
The paper begins with an overview of the sample before turning to the evolution of North 
Korean political attitudes. Not surprisingly, negative evaluations of the regime are widely shared 
across the refugee population, and there is even some evidence that members of the core political 
class and government and party workers are particularly disaffected. However, it is possible to 
combine our regression results with national level demographic data to derive estimated 
“approval ratings” for the population as a whole; this exercise cannot reject the null hypothesis 
that the attitudes of the underlying population are congruent with those of the refugees. 
We do not have true panel data, but we exploit the timing of refugees’ exit to gain some 
insight to changes in political views over time. Evaluations of the regime appear to be getting 
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 more negative over time. We find evidence of a declining hold of ideology as well. Although 
those who departed earlier were more willing to entertain the view that the country’s problems 
were due to foreigners, respondents who left later were more likely to hold the government 
accountable. Disaffection appears to be closely related not only with poor overall performance, 
but with corruption and abuse of office. Respondents also favored radical solutions; the 
preference for outright unification far outstripped those supporting reformist “third way” options. 
Following an analysis of attitudes, we turn to the prospects that these adverse views of 
the regime might be communicated. We find the barriers to such communication are high; even 
among this highly disaffected share of the population, ability to communicate disaffection 
appears low. The scope for overt political activity remains even more limited.  
However, there is evidence of an increasing willingness to defy government through 
everyday forms of resistance, such as listening to foreign media. We also show that there is a 
relative constant willingness to engage in clandestine economic activities that are corrosive of 
the state’s grip, and that these activities may be associated with a greater propensity to 
communicate adverse information. Indeed, some evidence suggests that the expansion of the 
repressive apparatus in response to these changes may contribute to politicizing the populace.  
    
Sample Characteristics 
 
The results reported in this paper are drawn from a survey of 300 North Korean refugees living 
in South Korea conducted in November 2008. The sample mirrors what is known about the 
refugee community resident in South Korea: the overwhelming majority of the sample is prime 
age adults, with just over half between the ages of 35 and 50; the majority are women (63 
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 percent).3 Residents of the northeast provinces are overrepresented, as has been the case with 
previous surveys conducted in both China and South Korea (cf. Robinson et al. 1999, 2001a, 
2001b; Lee et al. 2001; Chon et al. 2007; Lee 2007; Kim and Song 2008; Lee et al. 2008; Chang, 
Haggard, and Noland 2009a, 2009b). Most respondents were from North Hamgyong province 
(50 percent), followed by South Hamgyong province (15 percent), two provinces in the far 
northeast of the country. This distribution of responses actually makes these provinces somewhat 
less overrepresented than in earlier surveys, but these provinces do nonetheless account for only 
about 23 percent of the current North Korean population (United Nations Statistics Division 
2010).4 
 North Korea’s mandatory education includes a year of kindergarten, four years of 
primary school and a six-year middle school; at that point (age 15–16), students come to the end 
of mandatory education or are channeled into technical school (2–3 years), college (4 years) or 
university (4–6 years), and from the latter on to postgraduate studies. In our sample, fully 61 
percent reported having only a middle-school education, approximately equivalent to graduating 
from high school. Another 15 percent reported that they had technical school training with 21 
percent having college training. It is impossible to say whether this distribution of educational 
attainment belies North Korean claims about the extent (not to mention quality) of education, but 
it is nonetheless revealing.5   
                                                 
3 It should be noted that the refugee community in South Korea may not be representative of all those who have left 
North Korea. For example, an earlier survey, conducted in China, found that men and women were represented in 
roughly equal numbers (Chang, Haggard, and Noland 2009b). 
4 There are two main reasons for the overrepresentation of the northeast provinces: these rustbelt areas were by 
consensus the worst affected by the famine, and their geographical proximity to China makes egress easier relative 
to other parts of North Korea.  
5 A question about the education of the respondents’ father suggests at least some increase in educational attainment 
over time: 17 percent report that their father’s had only an elementary education, compared to less than 2 percent of 
the respondents in the sample. 
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 The occupational status of the respondents is complicated somewhat by the large number 
of women in the sample; 17 percent of respondents report that they are housewives. If we look 
only at those in the economically active population—excluding housewives, students, and 
retirees (73 respondents, or just under one quarter of the sample)—the largest category among 
those in the workforce is laborers (40 percent), followed by government (19 percent), merchants 
(8 percent, with nearly two thirds of those women) and professionals, farmers, office workers, 
soldiers, and others (each with between 5 and 7 percent).6 The pattern of responses is highly 
correlated with those to a question about the respondent’s father’s occupation, suggesting little 
occupational mobility, with laborer fathers (41 percent) and government-employed fathers (22 
percent) the two dominant categories, and little intergenerational movement across categories. 
 The North Korean regime has conducted a succession of classification exercises, dividing 
the population into a category of reliable supporters, the basic masses, and the “impure class”; 
these are commonly called the “core” (haek-sim-gun-jung), “wavering” (gibon-gye-cheung), and 
“hostile” (gyo-yang-dae-sang) classes respectively, and family background is a key determinant 
of life in North Korea.7 In our sample, the bulk of respondents were categorized as “wavering” 
(62 percent) with 11 percent hostile and 14 percent reporting that they did not know. 
Nonetheless, 14 percent reported being in the “core” group, suggesting that even privileged 
                                                 
6 The small share of farmers in the sample is unusual compared to past surveys. However, 14 percent responded that 
their work unit was a state farm or cooperative and in answer to a different question, 133 respondents—44 percent 
of the full sample—answered that they worked on a state farm or collective. A closer inspection of this group 
reveals that 54 of them, just over 40 percent, self-identify as “laborers” For our purposes, it is useful to separate out 
this entire group as “state farm or collective employees,” even though they reflect a variety of different occupational 
categories (in addition to farmers and workers, this group includes 34 housewives, 11 administrative staff 
[professional, government, office worker/teacher], 6 merchants, 6 students, 2 soldiers and 2 “other”). Because of 
their involvement in state farms and collectives and their probable rural location, we would expect them to constitute 
a distinct group. 
7 “Core” supporters of the government, including party members, enjoy educational and employment preferences, 
are allowed to live in better-off areas, and have greater access to food and other material goods. Those with a 
“hostile” or disloyal profile, such as relatives of people who collaborated with the Japanese during the Japanese 
occupation, landowners, or those who went south during the Korean War, are subjected to a number of 
disadvantages, assigned to the worst schools, jobs, and localities, and sometimes wind up in labor camps. 
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 political status did not provide benefits adequate to deter highly risky migration. There is some 
evidence of a cross-generational downward drift in status, though the classification of 
respondents is statistically indistinguishable from that of the fathers. Taken as a whole, these 
indicators depict a relatively immobile society, though it is also possible that the relatively low 
education levels, and lack of occupational or political mobility, reflects the stunted opportunities 
for those who took the risk to migrate, including as a result of their political status.  
 A final set of demographic variables of importance are the dates when respondents left 
North Korea, how much time they spent abroad before coming to South Korea, and how much 
time they have spent in South Korea. The date of exit is crucial in methodological terms, because 
it determines the relevant time frame for all of our retrospective questions, which ask about 
conditions at the time they left North Korea. 
There is ample variation in the sample in this regard. With respect to time of departure, 
we have an adequate number of respondents to divide the sample in multiple ways. For some 
purposes it is useful to split the sample into respondents who left North Korea before and after 
the 2002 reforms. These two groups are almost exactly even in size. For other questions, a four-
period breakdown is employed: the prereform group is divided into two: a “famine era” group 
(those leaving in 1998 or before, roughly 25 percent of the sample); and a “post-famine” group 
(1999–2002, again 25 percent); a “reform era” group (those leaving between 2003–05, 35 
percent of the sample); and a “retrenchment era” group (2006 and after, 15 percent).  
Duration outside North Korea, particularly time in South Korea, may also be important in 
shaping attitudes and perceptions.8 Those with the perspective of a long time as a refugee in a 
                                                 
8 By subtracting the date they left North Korea from the date they arrived in the south, we can also tell how long 
respondents spent as refugees in third countries. The sample confirms the difficulties of getting from North Korea to 
South Korea; the modal response was two years and the median three, but nearly 30 percent of respondents spent 
more than five years abroad before getting to South Korea. 
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 third country or as a resident of South Korea may view North Korea very differently because of 
the tribulations of being a refugee (particularly in China) or socialization to alternative views of 
the country (particularly in South Korea). 
  
Political Attitudes: Perceptions of Regime Performance and Accountability  
 
The motives of refugees for leaving North Korea have been highly contested in recent years. 
Chinese authorities, in particular, have deployed the argument that North Koreans in China are 
“economic migrants” rather than genuine refugees, an argument of dubious legal merit.9 Yet 
given the fact that economic conditions are so adverse, it is not surprising that more than half of 
the sample (57 percent) reported economic conditions as their primary motivation for leaving the 
country. Nonetheless, this was followed by political freedom (27 percent), fear (8 percent), and 
religious freedom (1 percent). The share citing these political motives is much higher than in an 
earlier survey of North Korean refugees conducted in China in 2004–05 (Chang, Haggard, 
Noland 2009a, 2009b). Changing attitudes over time appear to be one reason for this difference: 
the percentage citing political motives rises monotonically across the four eras of departure, 
spiking in the most recent retrenchment phase, providing some explanation for the larger share of 
politically motivated refugees in the more recent survey. 
We conducted simple tests to identify the demographic and experiential correlates of 
those citing political motives for leaving. There is little evidence that this pattern of responses 
reflects either the amount of time spent outside North Korea or in South Korea; it does not 
appear to be a function of “socialization.” Apart from those classified as politically hostile or 
                                                 
9 Refugees enjoy their status as a result of legitimate fear of persecution upon return to their country of origin. There 
can be little question that such fears pertain in the case of North Korea. See Kurlantzick and Mason 2006.  
9 
 
 having been detained by the political police (bo-wi-bu), respondents identifying political reasons 
for departure are disproportionately college educated and from Pyongyang—in short members of 
the elite (table 1).  
In order to gauge the sources of disaffection with the regime, respondents were presented 
with a series of statements about the performance of the North Korean government and asked to 
indicate their agreement at the time they departed the country running on a scale of 1–5 
(1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3=neutral, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree):  
 
•  “Kim Jong-il’s regime is improving” (REGIME), 
 
and for those who left North Korea after the economic reforms of 2002: 
 
• “As a result of the economic reform I was better off” (BETTER OFF). 
 
The first statement (REGIME) is a straightforward assessment of overall political and economic 
conditions. BETTER OFF is the Reaganesque bottom line: are you personally better off after the 
reforms than you were before? By dividing the sample into four eras of departure, we can trace 
out how contemporary attitudes have changed over time, if at all.10 As shown in figures 1 and 2, 
the respondents’ overall appraisal of North Korean regime performance is very negative. On 
average, nearly 87 percent of the respondents disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement 
                                                 
10 It is possible that the respondents’ perceptions were shaped by information that was contemporaneous with the 
administration of the survey. However, it is a plausible assumption that their impressions were shaped 
predominantly by conditions at the time they left; these were their last first-hand experiences with the country and as 
in the case of table 1, their responses do not appear to correlate either with time spent outside of North Korea or time 
spent in South Korea. 
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 that the Kim Jong-il regime was getting better. When broken down by era of departure, the 
respondents who left during the post-famine period (1999–2002) held the most negative views, 
those leaving during the most recent, retrenchment period (2006–08), held the least unfavorable 
views, though even among this group, 81 percent of the respondents disagreed or strongly 
disagreed with the statement that the regime was improving.  
Following the famine the North Korean economy began a slow, uneven recovery, and if 
anything, the respondents might be expected to misattribute the improvement in overall 
economic conditions beginning in 1998 to piecemeal reforms. The negativity of those who left 
during the famine or even its immediate aftermath is understandable; the continued negativity of 
those who left after the economy began to recover and reforms were enacted is more intriguing. 
Most of the post-2002 departure respondents (56 percent) disagreed with the statement that they 
had been made better off by the reforms, though almost a quarter of the sample (24 percent) 
agreed or strongly agreed with the statement (figure 2). The negative findings with respect to 
economic performance were associated with widespread perceptions of rising materialism (92 
percent), corruption (87 percent), and inequality (84 percent) (Haggard and Noland 2010a). The 
state’s attempt to reassert control after 2005 only appeared to exacerbate these tendencies: in the 
retrenchment era subsample, 93 percent of the respondents reported a need to pay bribes to 
engage in market activities.  
Given the negative evaluations on these issues (and additional performance indicators not 
reported for the sake of brevity), it is important to gauge the extent to which respondents 
believed that the poor performance was the result of government actions. The respondents 
increasingly hold the North Korean government accountable for these adverse developments, 
with the share placing primary responsibility on the North Korean government at more than 95 
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 percent in the post-retrenchment subsample (figure 3). The share citing the policies of foreign 
governments as responsible for their predicament falls steadily from 18 percent among the 
famine era leavers, to 4 percent in the retrenchment era group. 
In order to probe more deeply into respondents’ views of the state, they were asked their 
perceptions of the most effective pathway to both increased status and income. When asked the 
best way to get ahead in North Korea, officialdom (including both government and party) 
trumped either the military or engaging in business, with more than 70 percent of the respondents 
citing it in all sample periods (figure 4). The share citing “engaging in business” more than 
doubled from 8 percent among respondents departing in the famine era to 18 percent for those 
leaving in the post-2002, however, with this shift coming almost completely at the expense of 
joining the military. While the military as an institution may be of rising influence in North 
Korea, the large army conscripts and requires lengthy service and low-level soldiers appear to be 
treated badly.  
When asked “what is the easiest way to make money in North Korea: work hard at 
assigned job; engage in market activities; engage in corrupt or criminal activities; none of the 
above,” the most frequent response was that engaging in market activities was the easiest way to 
make money. Moreover, a steadily increasing share—approaching 30 percent in the post-2002 
cohort—saw corruption and criminality as the most lucrative career path (figure 5). There is no 
sense that fidelity is rewarded; only a small—and falling—share (a single respondent in the post-
2002 subsample) reported that working hard at your assigned job yielded fruit.  
We also posed a question on trends in the overall level of repressiveness of the system 
(“Government has put more restrictions on its citizens” [RESTRICT] [figure 6]). The share 
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 agreeing or strongly agreeing that the government is increasing restrictions on the citizenry 
remained relatively constant at 55 to 65 percent of the respondents across all four subsamples. 
Read in conjunction, these answers about repression and the sources of power and wealth 
provide interesting insight into political perceptions of the North Korean regime. Employment in 
state organs is desirable, but business and corruption are the paths to riches. These answers 
suggest strongly that official position is not valuable because merit or diligence is rewarded, but 
because the repressive power of the state enables corruption or criminal rent extraction.  
What solutions to these problems do respondents favor? They were first asked which 
alternative most accurately represented their views while in North Korea: maintenance of the 
North Korean government; installation of a new non-Kim Il-sungist government; unification 
with South Korea; or don’t know/none of the above. They were then posed the same alternatives 
asking what they believed now and what they believed the preferences of other people whom 
they knew in North Korea were. Given their overwhelmingly negative perceptions of the current 
North Korean regime, a preference for unification is implicitly under South Korean leadership. 
Unification was supported overwhelmingly: not only was there little support for the 
maintenance of the status quo (only a single respondent out of 300), there was little support for 
“third way” solutions in which North Korea would remain independent under an alternative 
political regime (figure 7). Although exposure to South Korea appears to intensify these 
preferences at the margin, the responses are so strongly supportive of unification that it is 
effectively impossible to do multivariate analysis; there simply is not enough sample variation. 
The respondents also indicate that their own views mirror those of their peers remaining in North 
Korea, though obviously there is no way of judging the accuracy of this projection.  
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 Determinants of Political Attitudes 
 
A survey of more than 1,300 refugees conducted in China found that political attitudes were 
correlated with observable demographic markers (educational attainment, age, gender, and 
geographic origin) as well as personal experiences with the regime such as incarceration in the 
prison system, loss of family members during the famine, and the belief that they had not been 
recipients of assistance (Chang, Haggard, and Noland, 2009a). We undertake a similar exercise 
on the core performance measures (table 2), using a polychotomous logit specification.  
The data are relatively noisy and the list of characteristics not robustly correlated with the 
pattern of responses is again relatively long, including the respondent’s age, gender, time spent 
in South Korea or third countries, and educational attainment.11 Not surprisingly, those in the 
core and wavering classes sometimes give the regime higher marks than those in the hostile class 
and there are some regional effects.12  
One surprising finding has to do with time trend. Those who left after 1998 have less 
positive assessments of the regime and its accomplishments than those who left during the 
famine. Although both cohorts experienced the deprivation of the famine years, the former 
cohort had at least seen improvement in economic conditions. Nonetheless, recovery from the 
famine did not affect overall perceptions of the regime.  
                                                 
11 The lack of impact of educational attainment is consistent with household economics results reported in Haggard 
and Noland (2010a), which showed that it was position within the society, not education, that was correlated with 
household economic experiences and attitudes, implicitly suggesting an economy where position was paramount and 
returns to human capital accumulation possibly quite low. It appears that educational attainment may be relatively 
unimportant in shaping political attitudes as well. 
12 Respondents from the far northeast provinces of North and South Hamgyong tended to regard the regime less 
malignly than those from other parts of the country. This result may be due to a sample selection effect. The 
northeast is regarded as the region of the country most severely affected by the famine. However proximity to China 
also makes it easier to exit. Relative to other provinces, the profile of respondents from the northeast may include 
those who had less traumatic experiences than those from elsewhere, but due to the relatively lower cost of exit were 
able to migrate anyway. 
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 Did the economic reforms have effects on respondents’ views of the regime? Not 
surprisingly, workers at state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were less likely to believe that they had 
been made better off by the economic reforms, while professionals and self-identified 
“merchants” were more likely to regard themselves as beneficiaries.13 But respondents involved 
in some forms of market-oriented activities, a category very much larger than self-identified 
“merchants,” were more likely to see themselves as worse off as a result of the reforms.  
At first blush this might seem surprising, but two considerations might help explain the 
result. First, the category of people engaged in market-oriented activities includes those 
exploiting opportunities in the market (“opportunity entrepreneurship,” presumably some of the 
self-identified merchants) and those pushed into the market by the collapse of the socialist 
system (“necessity entrepreneurship”). The latter group includes a large share of women, who 
have been disproportionately shed from SOEs and played a crucial role in household welfare by 
supporting the family through trade, but under duress. This group might associate the reform not 
with new sources of market income, but with the loss of welfare that accompanied the crisis-
induced reforms.  
However a second possible explanation for this result is that the reforms were never 
really intended to unleash private activity in any case. Rather, these partial reforms were ringed 
with a variety of controls that reduced the ability to make a living through trade (Noland 2004).  
In the introduction we noted the selection problems that necessarily affect the inferences 
that can be drawn from refugee surveys. However, we can control for one possible source of 
bias: that the raw survey responses may reflect the overweighting of some demographic groups 
                                                 
13 It is theoretically possible that rather than the demographic characteristics contributing the respondents’ views, 
causality runs the other direction, i.e., that bad (good) attitudes have landed the respondent in a bad (good) position. 
The regressions were reestimated using the respondent’s father’s political classification, occupation, and educational 
attainment. Usage of these instruments had no material effect on the results; these regressions are not reported here 
for the sake of brevity.  
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 relative to the underlying population. Despite the fact that foregoing models have been estimated 
from a sample of refugees who may not mirror those of the society as a whole, it is possible to 
combine the coefficients reported in table 2 with national level demographic data (sources 
described in the appendix) to derive estimated “approval ratings” for the population as a whole. 
First, we convert the mean sample responses, originally scored on a 1–5 metric, to a 0–100 scale 
to generate a “sample approval rating.” Sample approval ratings are simply the scaled mean 
score of each response variable. To project the nationwide approval ratings, we predict the 
probability of observing each response conditional on estimated national values of each 
explanatory variable. The predicted probabilities sum to one. To estimate the mean response we 
sum the products of each score and its predicted probability, giving us a probability weighted 
mean response. We then convert this value to a 0–100 scale to generate the estimated nationwide 
approval ratings. The same procedure is applied to calculating minimum and maximum predicted 
probabilities of each outcome, which are estimated at the 95 percent confidence level and used to 
establish confidence intervals for each response estimate. The sample and projected national 
means, along with their 95 percent confidence intervals, are displayed in figure 8. 
Unsurprisingly the estimated nationwide approval ratings are somewhat higher than the 
sample approval ratings, indicating that the sample marginally over-represents the most 
disaffected demographic groups. But these differences are not statistically significant; for both 
specifications the results fall easily within the 95 percent confidence limits. For none of these 
indicators does the projected nationwide approval rating rise above 30 percent. 
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 From Attitudes to Behavior: Political Communication 
 
It may not be surprising that both North Korean refugees and citizens harbor adverse attitudes 
about the regime or that these have gotten worse over time. Yet a crucial question for the future 
of the regime is the extent to which such views are communicated and become the basis for 
collective action. In the model of informational cascades, the political stability of the 
authoritarian regime is dependent on silence: on the inability of citizens to know what others are 
thinking and therefore to make common cause with them. Is such communication taking place?  
We again presented the refugees a series of statements about their experiences in North 
Korea and asked that they grade their responses on a 1-5 scale (1=strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 
3=neutral, 4=agree, 5=strongly agree). For these questions, however, we posed the questions not 
about the respondent’s attitudes and behavior but about “people” in North Korea. From the 
standpoint of political anthropology, these questions can be interpreted as a kind escalating 
ladder of dissent, beginning with the extent which people joke, followed by complaining, and 
organizing:  
• “People make jokes about the government” (JOKES) 
• “People speak freely about the government” (SPEAK)  
•  “People complain about the government” (COMPLAIN) 
• “People feel they can speak freely about their opinions of Kim Jong-il” 
(LEADER) 
• “Some people are organizing against the government” (ORGANIZING). 
The shares affirming the statement that people make jokes about the government, while 
rising, never exceeds 45 percent in any of the subsamples, and the share supporting the statement 
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 that people complain about the government never reaches 40 percent. Even among an unusually 
disaffected subgroup of the population—refugees—and despite their overwhelmingly negative 
assessment of the regime, less than half of the sample report that their peers joked or complained 
about the government. 
Kim Jong-il appears sacrosanct. Although free discussion of Kim rises steadily among 
those who left the country after 1998, even among those who fled during the post-retrenchment 
period, only 8 percent report that people spoke freely about Kim Jong-il. Indeed, the shares who 
reported their peers speaking freely about Kim Jong-il almost precisely mirrored the shares 
reporting that people were organizing against the government. 
The pattern of responses for RESTRICT, JOKES, SPEAK, and COMPLAIN are reported 
in table 3. (For the questions on Kim Jong-il and antiregime organizing there is not enough 
sample variation in the data to support meaningful analysis.) The results again provide mild 
support for the notion of greater cynicism if not outright dissent among some elite groups. Older 
respondents, members of the core class, residents of the capital city Pyongyang, and those 
working in party or government offices were somewhat more likely to believe both that 
restrictions were increasing and that citizens were joking and speaking freely about the 
government among peers.14  
However, political experiences and private activities also mattered. Detention by the 
political, as distinct from regular, police was associated with a greater likelihood of reporting 
joking (regression 3.2) or complaining (regression 3.3) about the government among one’s peers. 
Admittedly the direction of causality is debatable—it could be that the system is correctly 
identifying those engaged in politically deviant behavior. Yet it could well be that contact with 
                                                 
14 Party membership is significantly correlated with joking about the government with one’s peers if the share of 
household income regressor is excluded from regression 3.2. 
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 the system actually politicizes the respondent. It is notable that the minority (less than 13 
percent) who reported that they had formal legal proceedings prior to incarceration had 
significantly more positive assessments of the regime than the majority that did not, suggesting 
that treatment may be shaping attitudes rather than the other way around.  
An important finding for our purposes concerns the effect of the market. The share of 
household income derived from market sources is positively associated with perceptions of 
tightening restrictions and joking with peers about the government (regressions 3.1, 3.2). 
Again, counterfactual projections are made in an attempt to check if overweighting 
particular groups in the sample have distorted the picture provided by the survey respondents. 
The “national sample” provides an estimate of how we would expect a draw from the underlying 
population might answer these questions (figure 9). As before, for two of the three indicators 
relating to dissent, the projected nationwide values are slightly higher than the point estimate 
derived from the refugee sample (i.e., the sample under-weights those perceiving higher levels of 
social communication), though in all three cases the null hypothesis of equality cannot be 
rejected at the 95 percent level. For the RESTRICT indicator, the counterfactual nationwide 
projection shows even wider perceptions of control, though again it falls within the 95 percent 
confidence interval. 
 
From Attitudes to Behavior: Everyday Forms of Resistance 
  
Answers to the question about whether peers are organizing against the government comport 
with a wide array of evidence on the limits of collective action in North Korea. Organizations 
that maintain clandestine networks within the country—which have an interest in spotlighting 
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 anti-regime actions—have very little to report in this regard; overt anti-regime action remains 
sporadic at best (Haggard and Noland 2010b). The independent social organizations that played 
roles in political transitions in other settings—unions in Poland, the church in the Philippines—
are completely absent in North Korea while the repressiveness of the regime is now thoroughly 
documented.  
 This does not mean, however, that citizens are quiescent; disaffection may be channeled 
into private actions that, while not overtly political, may nonetheless have longer-run 
implications for the stability of state socialism.  
One example of such action is the willingness of citizens to access alternative sources of 
information that are likely to conflict with official mythology. Figure 10 reports responses to a 
question on access to foreign media. It is evident that the informational barrier is increasingly 
permeable: a rising share, a majority in the post-retrenchment period, report watching or 
listening to foreign media, and critically, a falling share (nil in the era of retrenchment) report 
having access to foreign media but declining to watch or listen. Not only is foreign media 
becoming more widely available, inhibitions on its consumption are declining as well. And it is 
foreign news media that are being consumed: when the respondents were asked to differentiate 
between access to and consumption of entertainment and news, the share consuming foreign 
news reports is almost 30 percentage points higher than the share consuming foreign 
entertainment products.  
Moreover, we find evidence that access to information matters. Consumption of foreign 
media was associated with more negative assessments of the regime and its intentions. This 
finding is of particular policy as well as analytic significance, as it suggests the crucial role that 
control over information plays with respect to the effectiveness of government propaganda and 
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 mythmaking (Lankov 2007, 2009). The availability of alternative sources of information 
undermines the heroic image of a workers’ paradise and threatens to unleash the information 
cascades that can be so destabilizing to authoritarian rule.  
The consumption of foreign media is but one aspect of a much larger phenomenon of 
engagement in private economic activities (table 4). More than 70 percent of respondents and 
more than 60 percent of their spouses reported that they engaged in trading, magnitudes 
consistent with an earlier survey cited in Kim and Song (2008) and Lee et al. (2008). Nineteen 
percent of respondents (and 20 percent of spouses) report participation in “other” private 
activities. The respondents were also asked what share of household income came from private 
business activities at the time the individual left North Korea. The results are staggering (figure 
11). Nearly half the sample reported that all of their income came from private business activities 
at the time they left North Korea and more than two-thirds—69 percent—reported that half or 
more of their income came from such activities. Only a handful of respondents—4 percent—
reported that none of their income came from the market.  
 What is striking about the extent of engagement in the market is its uniformity across the 
sample. Regressions were estimated in two forms: ordered probits on the ordinal responses 
reported in figure 11, and a simple probit in which the sample was divided between those who 
received all their income from the market and those who received nonmarket income (table 5). 
As with the models of perceptions of regime performance, the list of variables not robustly 
correlated with the market component of family income is long.15  
                                                 
15 Respondents’ sex; age; year or “era” of departure from North Korea; time in South Korea or third countries; 
educational attainment; residence in the capital city, Pyongyang, or in the northeastern provinces of the country; 
political classification; and occupation had no effect on their propensity to engage in market activity. Work unit was 
significant. August 3rd units, affiliates of state-owned enterprises that have statutory authority to engage in 
entrepreneurial activities, were more likely to earn income from the market than regular SOE workers, government 
or party employees, and soldiers. Agricultural cooperative or state farm workers also received less income from the 
market. 
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 It is again possible to combine the coefficients reported in table 5 with national level 
demographic data to derive projections of involvement in the market in the wider population. 
The sample and projected national means, along with their 95 percent confidence intervals, are 
displayed in figure 12. There is little difference between the sample values and the projected 
nationwide results; though the projected nationwide results are a bit lower (indicating that our 
sample over-represents the most marketized demographic groups), but for both specifications the 
results fall easily within the 95 percent confidence limits.  
Participation in private economic activities may have a variety of longer-run political 
consequences, for example, by weakening the state sector and forcing reforms on the 
government. Here we focus on a more direct route to politics: we asked respondents whether the 
market might become the locus for political activity. As the government has acted to control 
markets, most recently in connection to a confiscatory currency reform announced November 30, 
2009, scattered news reports have emerged of incidents in which market traders, mostly women, 
have protested restraints on trade (Haggard and Noland 2010b).  
 The survey asked whether traders cooperated with each other. The share of respondents 
agreeing or strongly agreeing ranged from 32 percent to 42 percent across the four time periods, 
although with no perceptible trend. Likewise, when asked whether traders in the market were 
beginning to organize to protect their interests, the affirmative response rate was 28 to 29 percent 
in all time periods. Although this is a minority of the full sample, it is nonetheless surprising; the 
market may not be an altogether atomized “space,” but appears to hold at least some opportunity 
for cooperation and collective action. Moreover, as we saw above, there is some evidence that 
participation in the market is associated with the view that the regime is getting more repressive 
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 and the perception that citizens are willing to communicate about the regime, if only through 
joking. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The constraints on independent collective action in authoritarian regimes and the corresponding 
atomization of civil society are well known. In North Korea, as in other highly repressive 
regimes, pervasive surveillance, a highly developed internal security and monitoring apparatus, 
and the liberal use of the penal system (Haggard and Noland 2009a) all serve to reduce trust in 
the society. Even making jokes about the government is risky, let alone complaining, disparaging 
the leader, or organizing against it.  
If approached with appropriate caution, refugee surveys can provide insights into public 
opinion and behavior in authoritarian systems that substantially nuance this simple assessment 
that “repression works.” First, repressive regimes are able to control behavior but even a highly 
elaborated propaganda machine such as North Korea’s is not able to control private perceptions 
and political attitudes. Objective measures of the horrendous economic performance of the North 
Korean regime are mirrored in the extremely adverse opinions refugees have about its 
performance. Although we cannot completely overcome the selection problems associated with 
such surveys, controls for demographic and experiential markers suggest that refugee views may 
not be as divergent from the population’s as is often thought, suggesting that highly repressive 
regimes—and particularly those with poor economic performance—remain vulnerable to 
changes in the opportunity or information structure. 
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 It should be stressed that all of these results pertain to a sample of refugees. One would 
expect this group to have negative assessments of the regime and multivariate analysis confirms 
that their views are more negative than those of the resident population. But at least controlling 
for identifiable demographic and experiential markers, these differences appears marginal; all 
counterfactual projections of the views of the resident population fall within the 95 percent 
confidence bound around the sample averages. At least on the basis of observable characteristics, 
it would appear that the highly negative evaluations may well represent the unarticulated views 
of large swaths of the North Korean public. 
There is some evidence that growing politicization is correlated with membership in the 
core class and employment in the government, party, or military. These findings are interesting, 
given that these respondents occupy relatively—even substantially—favored positions. Intra-
elite schisms are the Achilles’ heel of authoritarian regimes. To the extent that even relatively 
privileged groups are expressing discontent, it suggests either that the regime may not be as 
stable as is often thought or that slight perturbations could push future leaders in a more 
reformist direction.  
A second finding concerns the limits on the ability of such regimes to deflect 
accountability. A common tactic of authoritarian leaders is to rally support for the government 
by displacing blame for poor performance onto external and internal enemies. Respondents in 
our survey, however, were increasingly disinclined to believe state propaganda, which has 
consistently stressed North Korea’s “hostile environment.” Most respondents believed that poor 
performance was a result of the regime’s own failings and partial reforms of the political system 
were rejected in favor of much more radical reforms (political unification with the south in this 
case).  
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 A third set of findings has to do with political behavior. Although there is little evidence 
of overt political activity in North Korea, there is ample evidence not only of growing cynicism 
but of communication of disaffection and a growing willingness to engage in a kind of quiet exit 
from the system. This has occurred first and foremost by engaging in market activity and to a 
lesser extent by consuming alternative media that effectively challenges the regime’s narrative. 
With respect to the latter, there is evidence of declining inhibitions against consumption, as well 
as evidence that consumption of foreign media has contributed to disaffection.  
A crucial issue for the future of North Korea—as for other authoritarian regimes—is the 
extent to which these activities might provide the basis for a more robust and independent civil 
society. For example, small restaurants and the provision of other services are on the one hand 
merely businesses. On the other hand, they provide the space for communication outside of 
heavily monitored official work units (Lee 2009).  
 Taken in conjunction, our findings underline a classic dilemma facing highly repressive 
regimes. On the one hand, the extraordinary repressiveness of the regime is probably a rational 
strategy. When authoritarian governments pursue policies that have such disastrous 
consequences and diverge so widely from the public interest, the only way to maintain power is 
through coercion and surveillance. Yet such a strategy only has the effect of making the public 
more alienated, thus requiring still higher levels of coercion and surveillance to prevail. The 
post-2005 backsliding with respect to reform appears to reveal just such a dynamic.  
The second conclusion that can be drawn, however, is that loyalty to the regime is in 
short supply. If challenged, the leadership is not likely to find champions among the public. 
Campaigns to defend the regime through continued and increased sacrifice, 100-day campaigns, 
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 and other mobilizational appeals are less and less likely to work as individuals engage in more 
and more extensive “everyday forms of resistance.”  
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 Appendix 
 
Due to lack of a comprehensive and reliable data source for North Korea, the national 
level values used in the computation of the counterfactuals were constructed using various 
sources and techniques. To match our sample, data on past population were taken from the 
International Labor Organization’s database. Female and regional population shares were taken 
from United Nations Statistics Division (2010) reporting the final results of the 2008 Census of 
Population conducted by the Central Bureau of Statistics of Democratic People's Republic of 
Korea (DPRK) along with the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) in late 2008. Age 
distribution data was also taken from the United Nations Statistics Division (2010) for the 
calculation of the average age group of the total population. All variables were adjusted 
accordingly as a share of the total population between the ages of 15 and 64, the labor force age, 
to maintain consistency with our sample data, of which 96 percent are in that age group.  
To calculate work unit values, the army and unemployed or retired were assigned the 
values of soldiers and economically nonactive in the Korean Statistical Information Service 
(KOSIS) database. The shares for “State Farm or Agricultural Cooperative,” “State-Owned 
Enterprise (SOE),” and “Government or Party Office” were distributed in the same proportion as 
estimates of agriculture, industry, and the service sector reported in Noland (2000), with SOE 
employment adjusted for August 3rd workers using Gey’s estimate of traders. The remaining 
workunit share was allotted to “other workunits”.  
For the occupation variables, shares of students and soldiers were calculated from the 
KOSIS database. United Nation Economic and Social Council Report (2002)’s data on labor 
force distribution were used to assign shares for professionals and teachers, and the share of 
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 merchants was based on an estimate of the number of traders (Gey 2004). Social class variables’ 
shares were calculated by averaging figures from Kim (2000) and Hunter (1999).  
In calculating the sectoral dummies, the shares for “State-Owned Enterprise (SOE)” and 
“Government or Party Office” were distributed in the same proportion as estimates of industry 
and the service sector reported in Noland (2000), with SOE employment adjusted for August 3rd 
workers using Gey’s estimate of traders. The values of soldiers were added to the “government 
or party office” figure to match our “government, party office or military” sectoral dummy 
variable.  
To estimate the number of people who fall into the category of knowing of the food aid 
program but not believing that they were recipients, we take the targeted number of beneficiaries 
at the peak of the World Food Programme (WFP) (8 million, 1999–2001 per Haggard and 
Noland [2007]) and apply the percentage of people who knew of the food aid program but 
believed that they were not recipients derived from the refugee survey (67 percent), yielding an 
estimate for this category of approximately 22 percent of the population.  
To our knowledge no data exist on the total number of people incarcerated in North 
Korea, much less any figures for the share who have been incarcertated at any point in their 
lives. Indeed, the only data of which we are aware on the share of the population ever 
incarcerated or lifetime probability of incarceration are for the United States. So as a proxy for 
the share of population that have ever been detained or are currently detained, we used the 
gender-specific probable percentage of African Americans, born in 2001, ever going to prison 
during lifetime from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (2003)’s report, 32 percent in the case of 
males, 6 percent in the case of females. (Both are less than our sample averages of 45 percent 
and 29 percent, respectively.) Estimates for variables related to the specifics of detainment such 
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 as which police force was involved were taken from the refugee survey for lack of any 
alternative sources. Numbers from the refugee survey were used for foreign media exposure as 
well. Finally, for the four variables that represent participation in private activities, the total share 
of the population engaged in private activities was set to 47 percent, the central estimate of 
national level marketization of the food economy from Haggard and Noland (2007). Estimates of 
the number of individuals engaged in various forms of market activity could then be constructed 
by assuming that the distribution of different types of activity mirrored the refugee sample.  
To model current attitudes, it was assumed that residents reflected the views of those who 
had most recently emigrated, i.e., the post-retrenchment departure dummy was set equal to one 
and the dummies for other eras of departure zero.  
The categorical and binary dependent variables were converted to a 0–100 scale from 
which the probability weighted mean responses were calculated. 
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Table 1. Political Motive for Departure (probit: political motive for departure=1)
(1.1) (1.2) 
VARIABLES
Left North Korea: Post‐famine period (1999~2002) 0.206
(0.248)
Left North Korea: Reform period (2003~2005) 0.496**
(0.244)
Left North Korea: Retrenchment period (2006~) 0.798**
(0.322)
Left North Korea: Post‐reform (2003~) 0.430**
(0.188)
Hometown in Pyongyang 0.566* 0.578*
(0.304) (0.301)
Time spent in South Korea 0.093* 0.068
(0.049) (0.046)
Detained by political (bo‐wi‐bu) police  0.502*** 0.518***
(0.178) (0.179)
Class: Core 0.790** 0.843**
(0.343) (0.343)
Class: Wavering 0.244 0.293
(0.289) (0.288)
Class: Hostile 0.804** 0.827**
(0.364) (0.361)
Worked in a government/ party office /military 0.348* 0.318
(0.206) (0.206)
Education level: College 0.463** 0.461**
(0.196) (0.193)
Observations 300 300
Pseudo R‐squared 0.130 0.125
Log likelihood ‐152.2 ‐153.2
Chi‐squared 41.33 41.92
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Political Motive for Departure
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Table 2. Sentiments about the North Korean Government and Economy
     (Ordered Logit)
(2.1) (2.2) 
REGIME  BETTER OFF
Post‐famine Period ‐0.775*
(1999~2002)  (0.444)
Reform Period ‐0.391
(2003~2005)  (0.412)
Retrenchment Period 0.321
(2006~)  (0.451)
‐0.741***
(0.255)
Hometown in Pyongyang 0.796
(0.613)
Hometown in Far Northeast provinces  0.615* 0.571**
(North and South Hamgyong)  (0.365) (0.247)
Class: Core 1.438***
(0.481)
Class: Wavering 0.961**
(0.404)
Class: Hostile 0.481
(0.497)
Participated in Private trading ‐0.246
(0.249)
Participated in providing private services 0.360
(0.421)
Participated in other private business activities ‐0.574*
(0.314)
Participated in August 3rd unit activities ‐1.135***
(0.352)
Occupation: Professional  1.358***
(0.517)
Occupation: Merchant 1.220**
(0.493)
‐0.878***
(0.328)
Observations 201 263
Log likelihood ‐162.4 ‐322.6
Chi‐squared 16.83 52.41
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Worked at a State Owned Enterprise at the time 
you left North Korea
Watched or listened to foreign news or 
entertainment programs including videos or DVDs
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Table 3. Level of Repression in North Korea
     (Ordered Logit) 
(3.1) (3.2) (3.3) (3.4) 
RESTRICTIONS JOKES SPEAK FREELY COMPLAIN
Age when they left North Korea 0.239** 0.332***
(1=10‐19 2=20‐29 3=30‐39 4=40‐49 5=50‐59 6=60‐
69 7=70‐79) (0.105) (0.126)
Post‐reform Era (2003~)  0.783**
(0.316)
0.857**
(0.365)
Hometown in Pyongyang 1.112**
(0.497)
Hometown in Northeast provinces  ‐1.221***
(Ryanggang, North & South Hamgyong)  (0.306)
Class: Core 1.318** 1.445***
(0.585) (0.508)
Class: Wavering 0.747 0.566
(0.490) (0.384)
Class: Hostile 0.962 1.444***
(0.637) (0.525)
Occupation: Student ‐1.096*
(0.609)
Occupation: Teacher ‐1.081*
(0.587)
Occupation: Soldier ‐1.673**
(0.711)
Detained by political police (Bo‐wi‐bu)  0.823*** 0.562*
(0.297) (0.305)
Detained by political police only ‐1.198***
(0.414)
0.972***
(0.311)
‐1.381***
(0.367)
0.006* 0.010***
(0.004) (0.003)
Observations 195 205 206 203
Pseudo R‐squared 0.0769 0.0482 0.0864 0.0415
Log likelihood ‐249.7 ‐269.6 ‐184.2 ‐289.8
Chi‐squared 41.62 27.30 34.85 25.10
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Share of total income from private business 
activities (100 scale) 
Worked in a government or party office or 
were in the military
Know of prison camps & think they are unjust
Knew about foodaid but didn't receive any
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Table 4. Engagement in Private Activities
[Shares  of those who answered "yes"]
In addition to your work duties, did you 
ever engage in the following activities: Respondent Spouse
Private Trading  70.9 60.2
Provision of Private Services   8.9 10.4
Other Private Business  Activities 18.9 20.1
August 3 Unit 14.9 18.1
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Household Income Regressions
(5.1) (5.2) 
Income share from 
Private Business 
Activities (Categorical)
All income is from 
Private Business 
Activities (Binary)
Hometown in provinces bordering China  ‐0.339** ‐0.273*
(N. Pyongan, Jagang, Ryanggang & N. Hamgyong)  (0.134) (0.154)
Workunit: State Owned Enterprise ‐0.621** ‐0.682**
(0.252) (0.281)
Workunit: State Farm or Agricultural Cooperative ‐0.606** ‐0.291
(0.275) (0.304)
Workunit: Government or Party office ‐0.756** ‐0.655*
(0.302) (0.342)
Workunit: Army ‐0.797** ‐1.160***
(0.337) (0.434)
Workunit: Unemployed or retired ‐0.395 ‐0.080
(0.277) (0.303)
Workunit: Other ‐0.259 ‐0.133
(0.252) (0.276)
Number of Observations 300 300
P‐value 0.0140 0.00692
Chi‐squared 17.57 19.44
Log Likelihood ‐478.5 ‐197.3
Pseudo R‐squared 0.0180 0.0470
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Standard errors in parentheses
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